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Abstract
This article conceptualises the role of audience agency in the performance of American conservative identities within a 
hybridised outrage media ecology. Audience agency has been under-theorised in the study of outrage media through an 
emphasis on outrage as a rhetorical strategy of commercial media institutions. Relatively little has been said about the out-
rage discourse of audiences. This coincides with a tendency to consider online political talk as transparent and "earnest," 
thereby failing to recognise the multi-vocality, dynamism, and ambivalence—i.e., performativity—of online user-generated 
discourse. I argue the concept of recontextualisation offers a means of addressing these shortcomings. I demonstrate this 
by analysing how the users of the American right-wing partisan media website TheBlaze.com publicly negotiated support 
for Donald Trump in a below-the-line comment field during the 2016 US presidential election. These processes are situated 
with respect to the contested, dynamic, and creative construction of partisan identities in the contemporary United States.
Keywords Affective polarisation · American conservatism · Hybrid media systems · Identity · Online outrage · 
Performance · Recontextualisation · Social media · Traditional media · User-generated discourse
1 Introduction
This article analyses the public negotiation of support for 
Donald Trump among American conservatives during the 
2016 US presidential election. In so doing, it conceptual-
ises online political talk as a mode of political performance. 
President Trump’s election was a result that few commenta-
tors predicted and indeed was viewed by many as an unim-
aginable outcome (Martin and Krause-Jensen 2017). His 
election has nonetheless created a new drive to scrutinise the 
content and articulation of American conservative identity 
amongst scholars of American politics, particularly as this 
relates to matters of race, gender, geography, and religion 
(Hanson et al. 2019; Kreiss et al. 2017). This new interest 
in the form and dynamics of American conservatism has 
foregrounded the relation between affective polarisation and 
the formation of American partisan identities (Iyengar et al. 
2019; Mason 2018). Trump’s election has likewise under-
lined the important role played by the mediation of partisan 
outrage in shaping negative attitudes towards the opposition 
and the stereotyping behaviours of partisans (Abramowitz 
and Webster 2018; Mason 2018). Empirically, in spite of the 
growing interest in contemporary American conservatism, 
particularly as this relates to the Trump presidency, there are 
still only limited treatments of the controversies that existed 
around Trump’s 2016 candidacy among conservatives.
My contention here is that the public negotiation of 
Trump support in 2016 offers a compelling case study in 
how American conservative identities have been contested 
within a hybridised outrage media ecology. Outrage media 
operate by saliently marking the boundaries between par-
tisan in-groups and out-groups (Berry and Sobieraj 2013). 
In a hybrid media system, however, users of newer digital 
media maintain interactive and frequently competitive rela-
tions with traditional media and political elites (Chadwick 
2017). This permits an active and potentially critical engage-
ment with the representations of institutional media. At the 
same time, media discourse can serve as a powerful resource 
for politically significant behaviours (Chadwick et al. 2018). 
Beyond questions of the virality of populist rhetoric (Ger-
baudo 2018), there are urgent considerations to be made in 
terms of the symbiotic linkages between online incivility and 
both online and offline practices of political engagement and 
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activism (Poell and van Dijck 2017). These conditions have 
substantial social and political implications, encompassing 
not only the impact of “partyism” on modern democracies 
(Westwood et al. 2018) but also the entrenchment of out-
group animosity in the context of protest movements through 
the recycling of online discourse (Chan et al. 2019). A quali-
tative examination of audience responses to media outrage 
will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of these 
processes.
In order to explore this topic, I conduct a constructionist 
thematic analysis of 5288 user-generated “below-the-line” 
(Graham and Wright 2015) comments posted to the con-
servative news and opinion website TheBlaze.com over a 
6-month period preceding and following the November 2016 
election. In so doing, I examine the role(s) played by recur-
sive practices of recontextualisation (Bauman and Briggs 
1990; Perrino 2017) in the (re)articulation of polarised 
political identities in the US today. Importantly, through my 
focus on the public performance of self/other distinctions, 
my analysis distinguishes between attitudes and discourse. 
Thus, whilst recognising discourse as socially constitutive, 
I nonetheless follow Hedrick et al. (2018) in reflecting on 
the potential “ambivalence” (Phillips and Milner 2018) of 
online user-generated content, critically addressing a ten-
dency among scholars to focus on the transparency and “ear-
nestness" of online political talk. Instead, I write from a per-
spective which recognises its multi-vocality, dynamism, and 
ambivalence—i.e., its performativity (Bauman and Briggs 
1990). I argue the concept of recontextualisation offers a 
powerful means of assessing this performativity, whilst help-
ing to address a number of theoretical, methodological, and 
empirical shortcomings in the existing literature on outrage 
media and affective polarisation.
2  Right‑wing outrage, hybrid news media, 
and social identity
Although the election of Donald Trump as US President cre-
ates the backdrop for my research, it is important to note at 
the outset that these current conditions are not exactly new. 
On the contrary, the rise to national prominence of “radio 
priest” Father Charles Coughlin during the 1930s serves as 
a potent reminder that neither media outrage nor right-wing 
populism are novel phenomena in the US context (Catalano 
2020). Nevertheless, the “toxic alchemy of technology and 
politics” (Ong and Cabañes 2019) that characterises the cur-
rent era is certainly distinct in terms of its magnitude. It is 
also something that has been taking shape for quite some 
time. Over the course of the past several decades, for exam-
ple, partisan media that seek to elicit audience outrage have 
had an increasingly powerful influence on American poli-
tics and society (Berry and Sobieraj 2013; Rao and Haina 
2017). Whilst it is well established that partisan media prime 
partisan group identities (Levendusky 2013), outrage-based 
media have been defined by their notable propensity to del-
egitimate political opponents and opposing viewpoints as 
a commercial strategy (Sobieraj et al. 2013). The defini-
tion of outrage established by Berry and Sobieraj (2013) 
focused largely on institutional media. Here, I problematise 
this definition in terms of the contemporary prevalence of 
online user-generated discourse.
2.1  Outrage in a hybrid media system
Outrage media are notable in the extent to which they incor-
porate highly dramatised, sensationalistic, and misleading 
formulations of the self/other distinction in the form of out-
rage discourse (Berry and Sobieraj 2013). This goes beyond 
the denigration of opposing partisans. Importantly, research 
on mediated partisanship has highlighted how antagonisms 
between mainstream and partisan media are also discur-
sively constructed as a rhetorical strategy by media figures 
(Arceneaux et al. 2012). This draws attention to a prominent 
tendency among populist figures to characterise mainstream 
media in antagonistic terms (Haller and Holt 2019). Such 
strategies have been associated with the propagation of per-
ceptions of hostile media bias (Hansen and Kim 2011) and 
oppositional media hostility (Arceneaux et al. 2012), with 
distinct implications in terms of how partisan media audi-
ences perceive political consensus (Schulz et al. 2020). In 
the domain of outrage, social identity is a fundamental factor 
in understanding the relation between media and populism 
(Schulz et al. 2020), pointing to the powerful relations that 
link media and their audiences.
But outrage can also be user-generated. Whilst Berry 
and Sobieraj (2013) conceptualised outrage as a commer-
cial strategy, these genres of discourse acquire a new rel-
evance in the context of media that increasingly feature 
mechanisms for user participation. The notion of a hybrid 
media system, for example, takes media scholarship from 
a view of media dominated by logics of transmission and 
reception to one that is animated by logics of circulation, 
recirculation, and negotiation (Chadwick 2017). By pre-
senting outrage as a predominantly commercial strategy, 
Berry and Sobieraj’s model focused to a large extent on the 
outputs of institutional media (e.g., radio, cable television, 
but also blogs). Whilst they did focus on political blogs, 
the growing prevalence of participatory formats indicates 
a need to reflect on how outrage and incivility function 
in an online environment characterised by hybrid media 
logics. More recent research has examined the incidence 
of outrage in user-generated media (e.g., Middaugh 2019; 
Rao and Haina 2017). By permitting audiences to voice 
public (re)alignments with outrageous characterisations of 
political opposition through techniques of news sharing, 
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citation, and commentary (Chadwick et al. 2018), hybrid 
news media present opportunities to challenge the partisan 
oppositions performed by institutional media.
2.2  Media as resources for audience outrage
In a hybrid media system, publics may sometimes occupy 
the same participatory environments as political and media 
elites (Chadwick et al. 2015). So-called “below-the-line” 
(Graham and Wright 2015) comment fields are one such 
point of integration of elite and public discourse, constitut-
ing an important venue for internet-mediated political dis-
cussion in the 2016 election (Yacubov and Rossini 2020). 
They are, however, viewed somewhat ambivalently: on one 
hand viewed as a potential space for deliberation (Dahl-
berg 2011), they have also been associated with concerns 
regarding the implications of incivility and likeminded-
ness for practices of online political talk among Americans 
(Hmielowski et al. 2014; Sunstein 2018). This has a bear-
ing on online engagements with outrage media. In terms of 
their social and political relevance, Sobieraj et al. (2013) 
looked to the culture of avoidance that has long been seen 
to characterise American political talk in face-to-face con-
texts (Eliasoph 1998), arguing that engagement with outrage 
media may allow audiences to mitigate the risk of social 
stigmatisation by allowing audiences to engage in new kinds 
of political conversation. The fear of social stigma has more 
recently been conceptualised with respect to online dis-
course (Schwarz and Shani 2016).
A significant proportion of the existing work on affec-
tive polarisation in the US takes a quantitative approach to 
seeking out causal relations between media and polarisation 
(Iyengar et al. 2019). However, media can also fruitfully 
be viewed as resources for audience conversation rather 
than merely as the source of direct effects. For example, 
Chadwick et al. (2018) have proposed a media-as-resources 
approach to account for the ways in which audiences draw 
on media content in order to participate in “politically sig-
nificant behaviours” via social media. Whilst Chadwick et al. 
(2018) examine information quality, research on disinfor-
mation indicates that identity is also an important consid-
eration (Ong and Cabañes 2019). Indeed, such resources 
may also include “recognised figures of personhood”—i.e., 
images of social personae or identities—which audiences 
encounter through media discourse (Koven 2015). A focus 
on the relevance of social identity also resonates in impor-
tant ways with the model of affective polarisation that has 
become increasingly prominent in American political sci-
ence (Iyengar et al. 2019). Thus, if media can be seen to 
provide resources for politically significant behaviours, it 
follows that this can include the production of the self/other 
distinctions that typify outrage media.
3  Contesting mass‑mediated images 
of personhood through practices 
of recontextualisation
Due to an emphasis on the commercial strategies of media 
institutions, audience agency is under-recognised in the 
study of outrage media. Taking this into account, my 
research contributes to a body of work that seeks to con-
ceptualise outrage in terms of user agency. Here, I argue 
the concept of recontextualisation (Bauman and Briggs 
1990; Perrino 2017) can provide a theoretical mechanism 
for examining the iterative relation between user-gener-
ated content and the discourse of traditional media and 
political elites within a hybridised outrage media ecology. 
Whilst recontextualisation was initially articulated in the 
field of performance studies more than thirty years ago, it 
has more recently been demonstrated to be relevant to the 
study of online user-generated discourse (see Marques and 
Koven 2017; Perrino 2017; Rymes 2012). I focus on prac-
tices of recontextualisation within the discursive spaces of 
online partisan media in order to get a sense of the points 
of acceptance and resistance that typify audience engage-
ment with partisan media representations of in-groups and 
out-groups.
Recontextualisation usefully can be employed as a tool 
for examining how audiences creatively engage with vari-
ous discursive resources in the public negotiation of self/
other distinctions. It also provides a framework for think-
ing about their dialectical relation with wider modes of 
political engagement. With respect to more traditional 
media, Agha (2007) argued that media representations 
make “semiotically analogous images of self-available 
to many persons” by establishing mediated participation 
frameworks. Such mass-mediated images of personhood 
have been referred to variously as voices (Bakhtin 1981), 
characterological figures (Agha 2005), or social personae 
(Keane 1999). Here, I argue that mediated images of per-
sonhood may be recursively sedimented as cultural forms 
through iterative acts of recontextualisation, which entails 
the disembedding and re-embedding of stretches of dis-
course in new discursive contexts, creating opportunities 
for the transformation of their form and meaning (Wu et al. 
2016).
By creating “sediments” of signification (Anisin 2017), 
recontextualisation plays a crucial role in the articulation 
of politicised collective identities (Perrino 2018). In this 
sense, participatory frameworks enable audiences to con-
test and (re)negotiate the boundaries of collective identi-
ties in online user-generated discourse. Although the con-
cept of recontextualisation has not yet been applied to the 
study of outrage media, existing research has demonstrated 
its capacity to serve as a powerful tool for analysing 
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creative processes of identification, particularly the per-
formance of identity in online media (e.g., De Fina and 
Gore 2017). Whilst internet and social media technologies 
have been associated with everyday forms of linguistic 
creativity (Vásquez and Creel 2017), research also reveals 
how that creativity can be deployed with malevolent intent 
to create communities of exclusion (de Saint Laurent 
et al. 2020). My contention here is that recontextualisa-
tion provides a framework for exploring these digitally 
mediated forms of exclusion in the contested production of 
American conservatism. This article presents a qualitative 
account of these processes of identification in the context 
of American online political talk through a focus on one 
side of the polarised political culture in the US.
4  Methods and data
In order better to understand how audiences creatively con-
test mediated representations of personhood through prac-
tices of recontextualisation, it is important to examine the 
kinds of conversations in which people are actually engag-
ing. In this article, I focus my attention on online political 
talk in user-generated below-the-line commentary, taking 
TheBlaze.com as a case study.
Originally a venture of the conservative media figure 
Glenn Beck’s production company, Mercury Radio Arts, 
TheBlaze is situated within an evolving right-wing media 
ecosystem which amplifies outrage. It is typified by a ten-
dency prominent among populist figures to characterise 
mainstream media in antagonistic terms (Arceneaux et al. 
2012; Haller and Holt 2019). Indeed, Jutel (2013) identi-
fies the site’s founder, Glenn Beck, as a major proponent 
of what Laclau (2005) termed “the antagonistic division of 
the social field.” Beck achieved prominence via his nation-
ally syndicated talk radio show and, from 2009, as the host 
of his self-titled Fox News Channel show. Beck has been 
a contentious figure. After he referred to President Barack 
Obama as a “racist with a deep-seated hatred of white peo-
ple and white culture” (Kavanaugh 2009), Beck’s show was 
subjected to an advertising boycott orchestrated by left-wing 
activists. Beck eventually departed Fox News Channel in 
2011 to launch his eponymous internet television project, 
GBTV. After a number of consolidations, GBTV became 
TheBlaze in 2012, integrating with TheBlaze.com, which 
had been launched in 2010, creating a unified multi-platform 
media company led by Beck.
Although it has been argued that Beck’s specific brand 
of populism laid the groundwork for Trump’s presidency 
(Young 2019), Beck was a prominent voice against Trump 
during and after the 2016 US presidential election—a 
stance which saw Beck become the target of audience out-
rage through forms of attack usually reserved for political 
out-groups. Nevertheless, Beck would later come out in sup-
port of President Trump in May 2018, publicly stating he 
would support Trump’s 2020 re-election bid whilst donning 
a red “Make America Great Again” hat. This revision of 
Beck’s stance has specifically been related by some com-
mentators to declining viewership and difficult financial 
conditions that challenged the viability of TheBlaze as a 
media outlet (Gallagher 2018). Indeed, TheBlaze would in 
December 2018 be merged with another conservative media 
outlet, CRTV, led by erstwhile “NeverTrump” conservative 
commentator, Mark Levin, who had himself eventually 
expressed support for Trump after he received the official 
nomination as the Republican party candidate in 2016.
Against the backdrop of these transformations and rea-
lignments, my data illuminate the manner in which The-
Blaze served as a space of contestation in 2016, providing 
a snapshot of a media space in transition at that pivotal his-
torical moment. My data consist of a corpus of 5,288 user-
generated comments drawn from a sample of articles posted 
to TheBlaze.com during a six-month period from July 2016 
until January 2017. For ethical reasons, all empirical exam-
ples drawn from the data have had usernames removed. In 
the analysis that follows, excerpts are reproduced verbatim—
with no correction for spelling, grammar, or punctuation—in 
order to “retain the specificity of textual communication” 
(Gibson and Trnka 2020). These decisions have ethical 
implications that are not discussed here, but it is important to 
note that my approach was framed by the ethical guidelines 
of the Association of Internet Researchers (Franzke et al. 
2020). My analysis centres largely on controversies sur-
rounding Beck’s stance which, by extension, was frequently 
claimed to characterise the editorial position of TheBlaze.
I employ the method of constructionist thematic analysis 
(Braun and Clarke 2006), which focuses on the sociocul-
tural contextualisation of discourse. Through my focus on 
the public performance of self/other distinctions, my analy-
sis distinguishes between attitudes and discourse. That is, I 
focus on the performance of partisan oppositions through 
user-generated content, without making any claims as to the 
authenticity of the positions that may underlie them. I thus 
follow Hedrick et al. (2018) in problematising the assump-
tion of an “earnest internet,” orienting instead towards the 
potential “ambivalence” of online engagement (Phillips and 
Milner 2018). Constructionist thematic analysis is a useful 
tool in this regard, insofar as it does not construe people’s 
talk as “a transparent window on their world” (Braun and 
Clarke 2006).
This paper is thus an examination of how online partisan 
media users talk about political identity and difference in 
user-generated below-the-line commentary, with a particular 
focus on how commenters discursively engage with and/or 
challenge right-wing discourses of outrage online. Although 
my arguments do not seek to claim broad generalisability, 
AI & SOCIETY 
1 3
insofar as they are based on the qualitative analysis of a 
single case, they do offer a perspective on the complex 
dynamics through which categories of self and other are dis-
cursively constituted in a particular context. In that regard, 
with respect to the mediated cultivation of broad-ranging 
partisan antagonisms, my approach is motivated by the argu-
ment that qualitative analyses of this kind can contribute to 
a more nuanced understanding of wider right-wing partisan 
media ecologies (Faris et al. 2017). Such approaches become 
increasingly meaningful at a time of entrenched partisan 
animosities.
5  Renegotiating polarised political 
identities in the US
Taking TheBlaze.com as a case study, I here employ the 
concept of recontextualisation as a framework for examining 
three particular dimensions of audience engagement with 
the discourse of political and media elites: how self/other 
distinctions are given voice orthographically in digitally-
mediated discourse, how Glenn Beck’s positioning as a con-
servative is contested by commenters, and how the media 
choice of users is classified by commenters as a mode of 
political action. Although they are distinguished here for 
the purposes of my analysis, I see these as three interrelated 
elements of the same performative processes that typify 
user-generated responses to media representations. Whilst 
partisanship amongst media elites may have distinct foun-
dations and motivations when compared with the partisan-
ship of publics, media figures and audience “produsers” 
(Bruns 2016) can nevertheless each draw on similar cul-
tural resources in articulating self/other distinctions. Here, 
I focus on a variety of ways in which a hybridised outrage 
media audience openly contested those representations in 
their online political talk during the 2016 election.
5.1  Giving voice to identity/alterity distinctions 
through text
To begin my empirical discussion, I first look to the linguis-
tic and textual form of my data. As noted earlier, the forms 
of linguistic creativity specific to digital textuality have a 
particular relevance when studying the performance of self/
other distinctions. For example, Twitter has been character-
ised as a “vernacular site of social practice” and tweets as 
an example of talk that takes place in under-regulated space 
of orthographic linguistic habits (Squires and Iorio 2014). 
Processes of recontextualisation are here implicated in a 
number of ways. With reference to the participatory spaces 
of social media, for instance, Androutsopoulos (2011) has 
argued that “‘old’ vernaculars are recontextualised to index 
lifestyles and associated social types,” whilst “‘new’ digital 
vernaculars may index a range of political, cultural or aes-
thetic orientations.” In this view, digital vernaculars are 
contrasted with standard orthographic forms. In below-the-
line comment fields, the recontextualisation and expression 
of outrage by commenting users is open to creative use of 
orthography in ways that institutional media outputs fre-
quently are not.
What kinds of novel practices of linguistic creativity char-
acterise these spaces? The use of the portmanteau is a cen-
tral feature of an emerging digital vernacular in computer-
mediated communication. One of the most important ways 
in which speakers display an outrageous rhetorical style is 
through the use of name-calling, targeted at political parties, 
politicians, and partisans alike. My data are marked by par-
tisan name-calling through the creative use of portmanteau 
terms and other forms of jargon. Hossain et al. (2018) refer 
to this phenomenon as “creative political slang,” defined as 
“a recently-coined, non-standard word that conveys a posi-
tive or negative attitude towards a person, a group of people, 
an institution, or an issue that is the subject of discussion in 
political discourse.”
Throughout my sample appear a variety of references to 
Obummer, Dimocrats, Hitlery amongst others. These terms 
have a narrative complexity of their own, condensing forms 
of commentary that simultaneously reference identities and 
modes of character. They also appear alongside an array of 
conspiratorial and polarising claims, including the assertion 
that the purported Russian hacking of the 2016 US presiden-
tial election was merely continuing work already being car-
ried out by the Clintons and the Democratic Party. However, 
the following excerpt features one of the more prominent 
portmanteau insults directed at the liberal left:
People are energized to reclaim their country from the 
barbarians that have controlled it. The carrier politi-
cians who think they, and they alone run the country, 
along with then libtards who assumed they could sim-
ply change this country into just another third world 
socialist crap heap, without the people having anything 
to say about it.
The term “libtards” has a vibrant social life beyond the 
context of this particular data sample. Ebner (2019) high-
lights how, in the US context, libtard is a “derogatory term 
used by the Alt-Right—combining the words liberal and 
retard—to describe left leaning liberals” (2019, p. 169). 
Whilst Hossain et al. (2018) refer to the term as a form of 
creative political slang, Gao et al. (2017) classify it as a 
hate slur term in their analysis of hate speech on Twitter 
following the 2016 US presidential election. Shin and Doyle 
(2018) have related the use of the term to judgments regard-
ing group identities in online political discourse.
In the context of online user-generated discourse, it is 
clear that orthography has become an important mechanism 
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of not only expression but also of resistance. Modifications 
to the shape of text also perform important recontextualising 
functions. As Sobieraj and Berry (2011) noted of text-based 
communication, for example, “the deliberate use of upper-
case letters, multiple exclamation points, enlarged text, and 
so on” constitutes “shouting”—a form of meaning-making 
that has been sedimented through repetition. The following 
comment demonstrates the deployment of these expressive 
modes of formatting:
When you mimic like parrots and spout the Leftist ter-
minology (such as “fascist”) when such terms do not 
apply in the least, and intensely protest THE WILL 
OF THE PEOPLE of this country as far as the results 
of the election, you expose to all just how out of touch 
you really are. Donald Trump is not even in office, and 
yet these lunatics are accusing the man of complete 
nonsense. Where were you when Obama and the Dem-
oRATS were passing unConstitutional legislation and 
executive orders to bypass Congress?
As argued above, “below-the-line” comment fields are 
one point of integration of elite and public discourse. Whilst 
the structure of below-the-line comment fields plots out the 
key distinction between media and public, participants can 
draw on digital vernacular practices in expressing their 
agency as produsers. These practices distinguish the dis-
course of users from the standardised and regimented dis-
course of journalists and institutional media, even whilst 
users cite media content as resources in their responses.
At the same time, these digital vernacular forms are 
deployed in the performance of a specifically conserva-
tive vision of what constitutes legitimate political action 
and identification, as seen in this comment regarding the 
planned Women’s March on Washington, which eventually 
took place the day after President Trump’s inauguration:
So let them protest peacefully. Cover it once and NO 
more. Quit covering the tantrums, protests, and bulling 
agenda we voted out over and over. Start covering what 
the American people voted were important to us Now.
In this comment, the legitimacy of peaceful protest 
appears to be accepted at least to some extent. However, 
the comment goes on to exhort the media to “Cover it once 
and NO more.” Whilst the protestors may be entitled to 
their right to free assembly, the comment asserts the media 
should not be covering it. Rather, they should be giving 
a platform instead to the positions expressed in the elec-
tion. Whilst accepting that protest is a legitimate mode of 
engagement, this comment nevertheless situates the source 
of democratic legitimacy in electoral outcomes. However, 
through the use of uppercase orthography, the user asserts 
their positioning as a critic of mainstream media through the 
recontextualisation of digital vernacular practice and styles 
of speaking through digital text.
Androutsopoulos (2016) has argued that the “use of medi-
tational tools and uptake of mediated messages are common 
language practices in a mediatized society and fundamental 
to the circulation and diffusion of semiotic innovations in 
the digital age.” To the extent that the online political talk 
of users exists in a series of complex relations with the talk 
of others, user-generated below-the-line comments in the 
dataset frequently demonstrate explicitly heteroglot charac-
teristics (Bakhtin 1981). However, as these brief examples 
demonstrate, the affordances of digital text permit complex 
forms of multivocality that extend beyond simple citation or 
re-voicing of the speech of others. There are thus important 
formal ways in which audience outrage differs from institu-
tional forms of outrage discourse.
And yet, commenters must contend with the inherent 
power imbalances of these putatively participatory spaces. 
Indeed, soon after I compiled my dataset, the below-the-
line comment feature at TheBlaze.com was entirely disa-
bled in favour of comment facilities provided via TheBlaze’s 
Facebook page. Whilst the site’s terms of use have yet to be 
modified to account for this major structural transition, the 
action itself highlights the enduring power of media insti-
tutions in a hybrid media system, as well as the potential 
ephemerality of user contributions in a system characterised 
by the struggle over discursive resources. In sum, whilst 
the deployment of new digital vernaculars establishes the 
identity of the audience through the recontextualisation of 
novel discourse practices rooted in the specific affordances 
of digital media, audience agency is nevertheless curtailed 
by structural limitations on participation.
5.2  Challenges to Glenn Beck’s positioning 
as a conservative
Here, I explore a set of examples of how Glenn Beck and 
TheBlaze became the focus of the negotiation of Trump sup-
port in 2016. Research on the relationship between affect and 
partisan affiliation in the United States has demonstrated that 
polarisation has both instrumental and expressive founda-
tions (Huddy et al. 2015). This research indicates a role for 
orientations towards protecting party status and advancing 
ideology, for example. In keeping with the findings of such 
research, my data feature a significant focus not only on the 
policy positions and ideologies of actors from across the 
political spectrum. Rather, commentary also frequently cen-
tres on their personal moral character. Such constructions of 
identity/alterity are, I argue, important stylistic elements of 
the contemporary performance of partisanship. However, my 
data indicate that the meaning of conservatism is not some-
thing that is merely iterated without critique but is rather 
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actively contested through the discursive acts of media and 
their users.
With reference to my data, frequent positive characteri-
sations of conservatives are contrasted with an abundance 
of antagonistic representations of Democrats, liberals, and 
progressives. However, the data are also characterised by 
a prominent metadiscourse of authenticity in which a set 
of intra-group oppositions is actively constructed. Here, I 
present an illustrative excerpt:
I am a Constitutional Conservative and people like me 
(and Ted) have been defeated by populists, many of 
whom claimed to be Constitutional Conservatives. Ted 
has chosen to pick up and fight as much of the fight as 
he can with the half way crowd until the Constitutional 
Conservatives have greater success. I support Ted. He 
is still exactly who he said he was. Trump has been 
all things to many people and we don’t know who he 
would be as president because he is a liar. All that we 
know is that he will not be Hillary.
The focus on constitutional conservatism renders explicit 
a series of tensions that highlight an array of dissenting 
voices. This plurality of voices demonstrates ongoing, 
vibrant contestation in defining the meaning and nature of 
American conservatism. Within this field of distinction, 
antagonistic relations are highlighted not merely between 
“conservative” Republican voters and “liberal” Democrats. 
Rather, other Republicans are likewise deemed to have 
failed to live up to the publicly co-constructed standards of 
conservatism—e.g., Republicans In Name Only (RINOs), 
alongside other establishment Republicans.
The RINO—Republican In Name Only—is a key figure 
in the contestation of the boundaries of conservatism, one 
which draws on an institutional critique of the Republican 
Party establishment and their congressional agenda. It has 
been argued that engaging in primary challenges of RINOs 
was a key strategy of Tea Party movement candidates, with 
the aim of “overthrowing” establishment elites in the Repub-
lican Party (Libby 2015). Pejorative references to RINOs can 
be seen as attempts to circumscribe the kinds of identities 
that authentically can be articulated as conservative. Some 
combinations are highly valued, whilst others are rejected. 
The following excerpt, for example, features a positive claim 
to Christian identity whilst remarking the important role that 
is being foretold for Christians in their future work alongside 
constitutional conservatives to “save America”:
….although widely trashed on theBlaze site for switch-
ing from my primary candidate to a Trump supporter 
and attempting to show the hypocrisy of Glenn (Alin-
sky on parade), I have never wavered in my founda-
tional love and concern for Glenn … I AM a "2" Cor-
inthians Christian and "Constitutional" Conservatives 
will need ALL the Christians that they can muster in 
the future to save America, her sovereignty and pre-
serve her founding documents to save Humanity dur-
ing the perilous near future that we face…
One of the more notable features of this comment is the 
manner in which it explicitly identifies the author as a “‘2’ 
Corinthians Christian,” thus invoking the Second Letter of 
St Paul to the Corinthians and specific associations with 
evangelical Christianity. By distinguishing between constitu-
tional conservatism and other forms of conservatism, as well 
as between “‘2’ Corinthians” Christianity and other forms of 
Christianity, this comment thus highlights the multiple levels 
on which distinctions between self and other get produced. 
The comment also features a set of assertions of identity that 
establish notable relations between Christian subject posi-
tions and support for Donald Trump. The stakes are referred 
to explicitly: it is claimed that Christians and conservatives 
must work together to deal with a perceived threat to Amer-
ica’s “sovereignty” and “her founding documents,” as well 
as to the very survival of America as a nation.
In these intra-group tensions, the spectre of the Tea 
Party movement looms large. The movement was a mobi-
lisation of conservatives which had emerged soon after 
Barack Obama’s inauguration in early 2009. As noted by 
Chadwick (2017), Beck was able to leverage the horizontal 
online networks that had been established by the Tea Party 
movement when he organised the Restoring Honor rally on 
the National Mall in Washington DC in August 2010. In so 
doing, Beck was able to “reanimate” left-wing modes of 
protest and organisation from the post-war era (Our Literal 
Speed 2010) at the same time as he recontextualised rhetori-
cal forms associated with the civil rights movement (Young 
2019). According to Jutel (2018), these rallies form part of a 
broader apparatus of affective labour through which Beck’s 
media operations were able to capitalise on the “free labour” 
(Terranova 2000) of both his audience and Tea Party move-
ment activists. Identity here plays a fundamental role.
In the field of critical discourse analysis (CDA), Fair-
clough (1995) argued that traditional media discourse is 
produced through chains of recontextualisation that are man-
aged through institutional routines. This production format 
has helped to legitimate claims that news constitutes authori-
tative discourse – claims which are further supported by 
various professional standards, e.g., objectivity, that became 
synonymous with journalistic roles and practices during the 
twentieth century (Hanitzsch and Vos 2017). Although its 
partisan leanings are frequently rendered explicit, TheBlaze 
seeks to don the mantle of authority associated with jour-
nalism at the same time as TheBlaze and Glenn Beck decry 
the duplicity of mainstream outlets. This resonates with the 
tendency among populist figures, noted above, to character-
ise mainstream media in antagonistic terms, for example, 
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through the use of the term “Lügenpresse”—i.e., “lying 
press”—which recontextualises a term notably associated 
with Nazi rhetoric regarding press criticism (Prince 2018).
However, the embeddedness of media discourse does not 
cease with its transmission. Media discourse may undergo 
further processes of textual reanimation when recontextu-
alised by the audience. In spite of fears expressed regard-
ing the capacity for partisan selective exposure to produce 
echo chambers or deliberative enclaves (see Sunstein 2018), 
Perrino’s (2018) analysis of how politicised collective iden-
tities are performed and asserted on blogs highlights how 
active audiences can also contest the meaning(s) and signifi-
cance of both institutional and user-generated content. Such 
research is in keeping with the argument that the social life 
of media discourse is an important scholarly concern as a 
focal site of speaker creativity, in the case of both traditional 
media (Vidali 1996) and digital media (Danet and Herring 
2007).
In this sense, media are not simply vectors of influ-
ence; they are also sites of engagement (Androutsopoulos 
2016) and, by extension, contestation and transformation. 
Although audiences may establish various forms of “foot-
ing” or alignment with characterological figures performed 
through speech, as argued by Agha (2005), recontextualisa-
tion allows them to do so in ways that fundamentally chal-
lenge dominant meanings (Wu et al. 2016). In this sense, 
the authority assumed by media elites can be challenged 
in user-generated below-the-line comments. This form of 
resistance is notable in the following excerpt:
America is an idea, not a country.—This shows the 
fundamental flaw in Beck (and many others) thinking. 
It is one thing to support an idea, it is another to protect 
a nation built on that idea. Beck would cede the nation 
to those bent on its destruction in order to protect the 
’idea’. The problem is that failing to protect the nation 
will see the ’idea’ destroyed along with it. As those 
like Clinton and her Globalist ilk gain greater power, 
you will see the ’idea’ destroyed or relegated to the 
dustbin of History …
Whilst directly citing Glenn Beck’s (2016) claim that 
“America is an idea, not a country,” this comment draws on 
historical imagery and prophecy in establishing an antago-
nistic relation between those who would threaten America 
and those who would seek to preserve it. At risk in this 
apocalyptic battle is not just the survival of America and the 
American way of life. Rather, the very future of humanity is 
seen to be at stake. Importantly, by relating past, present, and 
future, the comment recontextualises a historically powerful 
mode of rhetoric (i.e., jeremiad) that has been dominant in 
the discursive articulation of American nationhood since the 
era of New England Puritanism (Bercovitch 2012). In this 
sense, this excerpt offers an example of the ways in which 
users can actively (i.e., creatively) integrate a variety of dis-
cursive forms when framing their own responses to media 
representations of partisanship and political agency.
The preceding excerpts encode a specifically parti-
san vision of America and American nationhood. This is 
achieved largely by connotation, through a focus on a per-
ceived moment of national crisis, with its attendant (albeit 
imagined) implications for the future of American culture, 
society, and identity. Beck figures centrally in this imagined 
conflict and is likewise portrayed as having a significant role 
to play in the coming collapse. Thus, whilst the final exam-
ple, above, provides uptake to Beck’s outputs, it nevertheless 
does so in a way that fundamentally resists his message. This 
form of pushback against partisan messaging highlights a 
key issue with analyses of contemporary partisanship (e.g., 
Mason 2018), insofar as a focus on the salience of in-groups 
and out-groups has privileged distinctions between Republi-
cans and Democrats. These data point to the importance of 
the kind of intra-party tensions that manifest in increasingly 
stringent purity tests within the Republican Party—tests 
that are frequently administered by outrage media figures 
(Rosenwald 2019). There is clearly debate in this case over 
the parameters of the test and whether or not Beck has failed. 
These comments thus demonstrate how fraught this process 
of partisan identification can be, even in the context of a 
hybridised outrage media audience that some scholarship 
might presume to be likeminded.
5.3  Media choice as political action
If media figures are a focus of the performance of self/other 
distinctions, so too is the media choice of users. My argu-
ment in this article is that commenters can use below-the-
line comment fields to actively contest the representations of 
personhood in the media they consume. This can also take 
the form of an explicit metacommentary on media selectiv-
ity in which media choice is recontextualised as a mode of 
political action. This focus is demonstrated explicitly in the 
following excerpt, which also highlights the “transmediality” 
(Bateman 2017) of Beck’s operations as well as the engage-
ment of his audience:
If you hate Glenn Beck so much, why do you spend 
the time on his site, listening to his show, reading his 
posts, etc.? Why? Go post happy thoughts on Breitbart 
or Hannity’s site. Be happy there instead of angry here. 
But I have a feeling you’ll continue to troll away, cause 
that’s what you do. Weak.
This excerpt highlights, in the first instance, the kinds of 
media and information repertoires (Yuan 2011) that obtain 
in the cross-platform behaviours that characterise contem-
porary media. An alternative media choice is offered, one 
which elaborates a partial classification of the right-wing 
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media ecology within which TheBlaze is seen to operate. 
By admonishing another user to “post happy thoughts on 
Breitbart,” the comment author seeks to patrol the affective 
character of user-generated discourse on the site. Impor-
tantly, whilst there is little mention in the data of positive, 
congruent media, this comment explicitly focuses on other 
right-wing media in explicitly negative terms.
Nevertheless, the user doubts this admonishment will 
have any impact, suggesting the user being addressed will 
“continue to troll away,” a statement that delegitimates the 
target’s contributions to the comment thread. Furthermore, 
by referring to speech as “trolling” (Hardaker 2010), the 
comment author highlights the problematic nature of nega-
tive or uncivil contributions. This comment thus articulates 
a set of judgments not only around forms of participation, 
but also their proper place on the site as well as within the 
broader landscape of American conservative media. In so 
doing, it publicly sets out explicit claims about the partisan 
character of media choice. At the same time, it also recon-
textualises modes of commentary associated with other 
right-wing partisan media spaces that are seen as oppo-
sitional in the context of negotiations around support for 
Donald Trump.
Beck was one of the most prominent conservative media 
figures to publicly stand against Trump’s candidacy and 
nomination in 2016. The near unanimous support for Trump 
once he had secured the Republican Party nomination left 
Beck isolated:
Glenn From the day you left fox I subscribed to the 
Blaze and when the channel came on Dish I also sup-
ported you through that also But you have lost me now 
I turn it on and all I hear is Trump bashing from you 
Stu and Pat I donnot like Trump or love Trump but it 
is all I have It is a binary election only 2 choices now 
and I am definitely not voting for Hillary.
The audience’s varied responses to Beck’s position help 
to illuminate debate over the proper role of media in the 
political process, as well as the audience’s publicly negoti-
ated understandings of their own role as both consumers 
and produsers of media discourse in the context of a hybrid 
media system. One of the more significant factors to con-
sider here is the claim that Beck’s “Trump bashing” is hav-
ing an impact on the user’s engagement, such that Beck’s 
anti-Trump stance, as a media figure speaking through the 
cross-platform constellation of media that is TheBlaze, is 
foregrounded not only as a key factor in a transformation of 
the user’s perception of Beck, as well as his colleagues and 
co-hosts, but also in a stipulated shift in their stated rituals 
of media use.
The tendency towards selective exposure to partisan 
media has been characterised as intimately bound up in eco-
nomic factors that shape the business models of media firms 
(Bernhardt et al. 2008). In that regard, Bird (1998) more 
than two decades ago warned against seeing audiences as 
overly passive recipients of whatever journalists put in front 
of them, arguing instead that we should see audiences as 
actively engaged in shaping the media environment through 
their engagement with an array of content. In the context of 
explicitly articulated loyalty as a supporter and a subscriber 
(i.e., consumer/produser but also, crucially, customer who 
has paid for these services), statements regarding a change 
in media choice acquire greater significance.
One of the benefits of a qualitative analysis focusing on 
claims of media bias is the way in which the dynamism of 
such claims can be revealed. In the case of my sample, audi-
ence commentary focusing on a perceived anti-Trump bias 
highlights a supposed shift in Beck’s partisan stance and 
thus the reclassification of TheBlaze and Beck as counter-
attitudinal media. This final example speaks in frank terms 
about the sizeable shift that has taken place in the author’s 
alignment with Beck and his message as a reaction to Beck’s 
perceived anti-Trump stance:
Of course Beck is disappointed. He dedicated his 
whole show to defeating Trump, and said some 
downright horrible things about Trump … Hillary as 
POTUS would be the end I’m afraid. At least with 
Trump we have a chance. I quit listening to Beck 
because his Gandhi phase quickly turned into out-right 
HATE of Trump. It got old and so negative I couldn’t 
listen anymore … I think Beck trusts in gold and his 
political candidates more than he trusts in God. It’s 
really sad, because I used to be a HUGE Beck sup-
porter. I still visit this site often and comment some-
times, but I will probably never listen to Beck again, 
let alone watch the Blaze channel that I have access to.
Insofar as the comment makes explicit reference to the 
impact that Beck’s position has had on the commenter’s 
viewing habits, media use here is attributed political dimen-
sions, thereby foregrounding media choice as a mode of 
political action.
As TheBlaze was framed increasingly as oppositional 
media, this blending of consumer and political discourses 
in user-generated narratives around engagement with The-
Blaze became a matter of growing relevance. Commentary 
on media choice here became a mechanism for performing 
alignments with perspectives on disputed forms of parti-
sanship. In this way, the public contestation of oppositional 
identities became a prominent factor in shaping not only 
practices of media selectivity but also public understand-
ings of the impacts of choosing to engage with particular 
forms of media. Media choice can in this sense be seen to be 
recontextualised as politically significant behaviour. How-
ever, these data also clearly demonstrate the relevance of 
media choice in the mediated performance of partisanship.
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6  Conclusions
In this article, I have argued that recontextualisation pro-
vides a powerful conceptual framework for examining the 
role of audience agency in the (re)articulation of politi-
cised collective identities in a hybridised outrage media 
ecology. Whereas in their definitional work, Berry and 
Sobieraj (2013) conceptualised outrage as a commercial 
strategy, this model is problematised in a hybrid media 
system within which users of newer digital media main-
tain interactive and frequently competitive relations with 
traditional media and political elites (Chadwick 2017). 
By permitting audiences to voice public (re)alignments 
with outrageous characterisations of political opposition 
through an array of discursive techniques of recontex-
tualisation, hybrid news media present opportunities to 
challenge the partisan oppositions performed by institu-
tional media. At the same time, online political talk in 
below-the-line commentary was here conceived as a het-
eroglot (i.e., multivocal) social practice in which some-
times antagonistic voices, characterological figures, or 
social personae are articulated or brought into alignment 
by participants through iterative and reflexive practices of 
recontextualisation.
Whilst media discourse may serve as a significant 
resource for audience conversation, my data thus reveal 
numerous points of engagement with partisan content that 
centre on an explicit and creative contestation of media 
representations. These data show that although the out-
rage discourse of commercial partisan media may seek to 
recruit their audiences into an array of antagonistic sub-
ject positions, this ideological work is open to sometimes 
forceful resistance. Recontextualisation is a key tool in this 
process, one which allows participants to creatively engage 
with institutional outrage media whilst articulating their 
own antagonistic visions of the social world. The manner 
in which users counter and contest such discursive con-
structs is illustrative of the struggle for discursive author-
ity that characterises hybrid media systems. At the same 
time, it should duly be noted that these creative forms of 
resistance can represent alignments with other forms of 
elite cueing within the context of networked outrage.
My data demonstrate how conservative identities are 
contested and (re)negotiated in online user-generated 
media discourse. In particular, my data indicate that users 
have the capacity to recontextualise the rhetorical frame-
works of institutional outrage discourse, (re)deploying 
them in the characterisation of media they view as insuf-
ficiently conservative. These are meaningful findings in 
terms of contemporary forms of political communication. 
Whilst there have been prominent arguments positing the 
emergence of deliberative enclaves as a response to the 
fragmentation of the online public sphere (Sunstein 2018), 
my data indicate that this vision is insufficient to describe 
actually existing media practices. The case study presented 
here demonstrates not only the dynamic nature of audience 
positioning but also the possibility that alignments with 
partisan media can shift dramatically based on the vagar-
ies of the political moment. In that regard, the production 
of self/other distinctions was here described as a process 
that is driven by various forms of creative iteration. In this 
case, acts of repetition were shown to be characterised by 
a fundamental tension between citation and contestation—
between replication and transformation.
Although commenters can be seen to play an active role 
in shaping both the market for partisan content and the form 
of hybrid partisan media discourse online, this struggle for 
discursive authority should be viewed as embedded within a 
broader hegemonic struggle to define the boundaries of con-
temporary American conservatism, which is itself a strug-
gle touching on encoded representations of religion, race, 
and social status amongst other factors. As fears propagate 
regarding the linkages between online outrage and demo-
cratic dysfunction, one of the key tasks for social scientists 
will be to examine where publics stand on these matters and 
to represent their role rigorously. My analysis reveals that 
this is not a simple matter of media influence. Following the 
work of Silverstone (2002), I conclude, if partisan media are 
to continue to play an outsized role in the social and politi-
cal life of Americans, there must be greater recognition of 
the complicity and culpability of audiences—as consumers 
and produsers—in the consequences of these practices. In 
this sense, a complex set of relations obtains between medi-
ated outrage and broader spheres of political participation. 
Violent manifestations of partisan animosity and racial ten-
sions in the US today clearly indicate the growing need to 
further examine how engagements with and through media 
contribute to these processes of opposition and exclusion.
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